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Abstract 
Shade-grown coffee provides a livelihood to many farmers, protects biodiversity, and creates 
environmental services. Many shade-coffee farmers have abandoned production in recent years, however, 
in response to declines in international coffee prices. This paper builds a farmer decision model under 
price uncertainty and uses simulation analysis of that model to examine the likely impact of various 
policies on abandonment of shade-coffee plantations. Using information from coastal Oaxaca, Mexico, 
this paper examines the role of various constraints in abandonment decisions, reveals the importance of 
the timing of policies, and characterizes the current situation in the study region.  
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Shade-Grown Coffee: Simulation and Policy Analysis for Coastal 
Oaxaca, Mexico 
Michael B. Batz, Heidi J. Albers, Beatriz Ávalos-Sartorio, and Allen Blackman∗
Introduction 
Premium coffee sellers market shade-grown coffee as a green or environmentally friendly 
product because its production maintains environmental services and biodiversity, particularly 
when it is grown below a largely natural forest stand (Perfecto et al. 1996). In Mexico, two-thirds 
of all coffee production involves “traditional” management, which requires few inputs or 
mechanization; under traditional management coffee is grown in the forest understory or in the 
shade of trees (Moguel and Toledo 1999). Promoting shade-grown coffee in Mexico could prove 
important in protecting biodiversity because the 14 main coffee-growing regions in Mexico have 
all been designated biodiversity “hotspots” (Moguel and Toldeo 1999). Because such a small 
fraction of these coffee farms are officially certified as “shade grown,” “bird friendly,” or 
“organic,” however, shade-grown coffee farmers provide public goods without incentives or 
compensation beyond the lower sale price of standard non-shade-grown coffee.  
In the last 15 years, coffee prices have fallen significantly; many shade-grown coffee 
farmers have therefore abandoned coffee production. Anecdotal information from our study 
region, Sierra Sur y Costa in Oaxaca, Mexico, describes a marked upturn in the number of 
farmers who “abandon” their shade-grown coffee plantations for some portion of the year, 
traveling to the cities to find employment; and in the number of farmers who have abandoned 
their shade-grown coffee plantations altogether. When farmers abandon their plantations, the 
forested land comes under threat of conversion to a nonforest land cover through logging or 
cropping. Such conversion dramatically alters the ability of the land to provide habitat for birds 
and other animals, or to provide environmental services, such as erosion control.1
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Oregon. Beatriz Ávalos-Sartorio is Professor at Universidad Del Mar, Oaxaca, Mexico. Correspondence should be 
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this discussion paper has been submitted for peer-reviewed publication. 
1 This abandonment also creates social disruption in rural communities when male farmers, and sometimes whole 
families, leave the area in search of wage labor jobs. 
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Despite the increasing popularity of shade-grown coffee with U.S. customers and the 
push by many international organizations to promote this production process, we know 
remarkably little about how shade-grown coffee farmers make decisions about maintenance, 
harvest, and abandonment, and thus how they will react to policies to promote shade-grown 
coffee. This paper develops a stylized model of farmers’ year-by-year decisions under 
uncertainty about future prices, a model based on interviews conducted in this region of Oaxaca. 
A key feature of the coffee production function is that neglect of maintenance activities in a 
given year leads to lower yields in subsequent years. Parameterizing the model with data from 
the area allows us to run simulations that depict the farmer’s behavior in response to price paths 
and various policies. These simulations provide evidence about the likely impact of policy on the 
probability that farmers will abandon their shade-grown coffee plantations over the coming 20 
years. With rural welfare and biodiversity conservation under threat from shade-grown coffee 
plantation abandonment, policies to slow the rate of abandonment would have both social and 
environmental benefits. This paper considers the effectiveness of various policies, and the timing 
of these policies, in enabling farmers to remain on their coffee plantations. The paper also 
examines some implementation issues using data from coastal Oaxaca, and presents a case study 
using recent historical price data for the region. 
Shade-Grown Coffee Production in Oaxaca’s Sierra Sur y Costa 
The forests of Oaxaca’s Sierra Sur y Costa contain many shade-grown coffee plantations 
and high levels of biodiversity; because of this, we have used this region to form the empirical 
basis for this analysis. The Smithsonian Migratory Bird Center has designated this region an 
Important Bird Area—shade-grown coffee plantations offer important habitat to many birds 
(Rice and Ward 1996). In addition, the forests provide many environmental services, such as 
erosion control and flood protection, on which coastal farms and fisheries rely (Ávalos-Sartorio 
2002). 
The Sierra Sur y Costa region of Oaxaca produces approximately one-fifth of Mexico’s 
coffee, with three-quarters of the coffee acreage in the region managed by poor, small-scale 
farmers (Nestel 1995). Most of these farmers grow coffee bushes in the understory of natural 
forest in a shaded system. Although lower yielding, this traditional production system has 
advantages for poor farmers over sun-grown coffee because it obviates the need for expensive 
clearing activities, reduces weeding, and requires far fewer inputs such as fertilizers and 
pesticides (Moguel and Toledo 1999, Donald 2004). This production system relies primarily on 
labor input for both harvest and plantation maintenance activities. 
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In extensive interviews with farmers from varied backgrounds and locations in the 
region, they describe a similar path toward abandoning coffee production. The story begins with 
declines in coffee prices, which drop too low for farmers to cover the basic subsistence needs of 
their families. As a result, farmers migrate temporarily to towns to generate cash income, 
forgoing important farm maintenance activities such as pruning. Unfortunately, the future yield 
from coffee plants declines when the plants are not maintained; lower yields require higher 
prices to cover fixed costs, so declines in yield result in even greater difficulty meeting 
subsistence needs in future years, even if prices recover. That prospect, in turn, implies that, in 
subsequent years, farmers may again need to forgo maintenance activities for wage employment, 
which means that future yields will decline even further. Through this mechanism in which low 
prices result in forgone maintenance and forgone maintenance results in lower yields, even a 
single bad-price year can set farmers on a downward slide of declining yields and income. 
Eventually, due to lack of maintenance activities, yields drop so low that farmers cannot even 
cover harvesting costs and are forced to abandon their plantations entirely.  
Complicating the situation further, if coffee cherries are not harvested from a plant in any 
given year the yield from that plant drops off precipitously thereafter. Harvest costs are large, 
and in years when prices are particularly bad, some farmers may forgo harvesting. That decision 
is tantamount to abandoning the plantation, because only very significant investment can 
reinvigorate a coffee plantation once the cherries have been left unharvested for a year. 
In our interviews, poorer farmers began this downward slide at higher “bad” prices than 
the prices at which wealthy farmers began to slide, in part because poorer farmers had little 
recourse in terms of credit or wealth to allow them to perform maintenance activities in bad-price 
years. In the last two seasons, however, even relatively wealthy farmers have decided to forgo 
maintenance and even harvesting on some or all of their plantations. Policies could focus on 
enabling farmers to withstand bad-price years without reducing maintenance activities, to stem 
such abandonment and to prevent the potential losses in rural welfare and biodiversity. 
Methodology 
To determine whether policies will be effective in reducing abandonment of coffee 
plantations, we predict farmer behavior over time using a stylized decision model. In each period 
represented in the model, the farmer, parameterized to represent a typical farmer in our study 
region, maximizes the net present value of a future stream of income by allocating labor between 
coffee production and wage employment. The farmer faces constraints on total labor time, costs 
of subsistence, and available credit. We drew coffee prices randomly in each period from a 
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predefined probability distribution; the farmer faces uncertainty about future coffee prices, but 
knows the distribution from which prices are drawn. In each period, the farmer makes one of 
three possible decisions:  
The farmer can “harvest and maintain” (HM), harvesting and selling coffee and 
performing maintenance on the plantation to increase future yields; HM has costs for hired labor, 
as well as non-labor costs, such as transportation, fertilizers, and pesticides. 
The farmer can “harvest only” (HO), harvesting and selling coffee and working in town 
using remaining labor time. HO has costs for hired labor, as well as non-labor costs, though only 
for the harvesting activities and not for maintenance activities. 
The farmer can permanently “abandon” (A) the plantation, working in town with all 
available labor time. Agronomic constraints imply that forgoing harvesting in a given year 
decreases yields so dramatically that doing so is equivalent to permanent abandonment.  
In a given period, the farmer makes his or her decision by calculating the expected net 
present value of HM, HO, and A, based on that period’s realized coffee price and expectations 
about prices in future periods. The farmer then chooses the option that provides the stream of 
income with the greatest expected net present value. The farmer recognizes that uncertainty 
about prices is dispelled in each period and uses a closed-loop decision rule to capture the value 
of that forthcoming price information in the face of largely irreversible declines in yield after HO 
or A. 
Performing maintenance activities is much more costly than harvesting alone because of 
additional hired-labor requirements and because the farmer earns no income through off-farm 
wage employment. This situation is offset, however, by comparatively greater yields in future 
periods. The farmer who opts to maintain (HM) in a given period expects the higher costs in that 
period to be more than recouped by higher yields in subsequent periods, as compared with 
harvesting without maintenance (HO). In this region, forgoing maintenance in one year can 
depress yields enough to the point that it will take several years of maintenance to recover.  
In our model, yield is a direct result of biomass, which follows an S-shaped growth 
function, and both yield and biomass are higher if farmers completed maintenance activities in 
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prior periods (see Equation 1.4b).2 In each period, the farmer must meet a subsistence income 
constraint S. If the farmer faces a particularly low price in a given year and has not accumulated 
enough wealth to meet subsistence needs, the farmer may not be able to undertake maintenance 
activities or perhaps even to harvest. In the benchmark, the farmer has access to intraperiod 
credit that the farmer must repay at harvest, modeled as an additional constraint. In some 
scenarios, farmers also face an interperiod credit constraint. 
In sum, the farmer solves a constrained dynamic optimization problem (Equation 1) 
under price uncertainty (with price revealed in each period) by choosing an action, kt, for the 
current period in t=1 to T from a set of actions Kt={HMt, HOt, At}, and while meeting 
subsistence and credit constraints and considering the impact of current choices on future values. 
The choice of A is irreversible, and the choice of HO versus HM implies a difference between 
future yields because these land uses alter biomass differently. The following equations 




V =v1(k1)+E[max{v2(k2)+max{v3(k3)+...+max{vT(kT)}...}]   (1) 
s.t. 
Value Equation: vt(kt)= ptq(kt)+wl(kt)−c(kt) (1.1) 
 
where q(kt) is the output associated with kt, l(kt) is the labor time spent in off-farm 
employment associated with choice kt, p is the price of the coffee output, w is the off-farm wage, 
and c(kt) is the cost associated with each choice as defined by 
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( )              if 
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, (1.2) 
where ch is harvest costs, cc is intraperiod credit costs, and cm is maintenance costs. 
 
2 In our model and simulations, farmers do not face yield uncertainty; all of the uncertainty is contained in price 
fluctuations. This assumption simplifies the model and places the emphasis of the discussion on policies and actions 
that stem from reactions to price uncertainty.  
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Labor Time Constraint:     (1.3) 
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where q is yield growing according to a sigmoid equation, q  represents yield carrying 
capacity, and γ is the intrinsic growth rate that is reduced by a factor m when no maintenance 
occurs.  
Wealth accumulation: 
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,   (1.4c) 
where s is the savings rate on annual profits.  
Price distribution: p∼N(X,X)   (1.5) 
Subsistence constraint: vi(ki)+Wi≥S    (1.6) 
 
The first-order conditions simply show that the farmer will perform maintenance (HM) 
when the discounted expected value of future years offsets the current costs; that the farmer will 
harvest only (HO) when subsistence constraints prevent HM or when the maintenance costs are 
not balanced by future yield improvements; and that the farmer will abandon (A) when 
constrained by subsistence requirements or when the expected future stream of income from 
farming is lower than that of working for off-farm wages.  
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In order to look at pathways toward abandonment of coffee plantations, however, we 
need to explore behavior in response to price draws rather than focus on first-order conditions. 
To do this, we use a numerical solution and simulation approach, working within the MATLAB 
programming framework (see Appendix B). The simulation model projects a farmer forward for 
some number of years based on a set of initial conditions. In each year, the model generates a 
decision rule, which is conditional on starting values and prior history of actions (with biomass 
and accumulated wealth as state variables). In the benchmark case, the decision rule considers 
expectations of the next 10 years. The marginal difference in behavior between farmers who look 
forward 10 years as opposed to eleven or twelve years is trivial, but the computational costs of 
extending the planning horizon are decidedly nontrivial (see Appendix A). As the simulation 
model is “run forward,” we apply the decision rule in each year; we draw the coffee price in each 
year randomly from a known price distribution, and the results of the decision rule affect yield 
and wealth in the subsequent period. Over 20 years, the program maps out the farmer’s decisions 
and the state variables for each year of that random price sequence. Using a Monte Carlo 
approach, we run the simulation model through 150 iterations using 150 random sequences of 
price draws (see Appendix A). We compute various statistics over all 150 iterations, with the 
percentage of farmers—that is, the percentage of iterations—who have abandoned by each 
simulation year being of particular importance for this discussion.3  
Data and Benchmark Results 
To place our results and discussion in a relevant setting, we conducted interviews with 
farmers in coastal Oaxaca. We asked them about their decisions, costs, constraints, and yields. 
We combined those data with information about agronomic characteristics of the costs of 
production, farm size, credit availability, wages, and prices to determine the parameters and 
functional forms used in the benchmark and subsequent analysis. The benchmark parameter 
values shown in Table 1 represent the yield, price levels, and price variability seen in the 1990s. 
We draw prices from a normal distribution, with the mean and standard deviation defined to be 
                                                 
3 Increasing the number of iterations beyond 150 resulted in no statistically significant effect to variables of interest 
and therefore did not merit the additional computing time (see Appendix A). 
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equivalent to real coffee prices witnessed in the region from 1998 through 2003.4 In the 
benchmark, as in the region, farmers do not have access to interperiod credit. Interviews 
revealed, however, that most farmers rely on high-interest short-term loans from coffee buyers to 
cover expenses during the growing season. We include the cost of these loans in the model as an 
additional cost of harvesting. The benchmark reflects the situation of a typical coffee farmer, in 
that farmers begin with minor wealth but accumulate wealth by saving 10 percent of their profits 
above subsistence in each period. 
In the benchmark simulation, the farmer abandons coffee production by Year 5 in 15 
percent of random price path iterations. Henceforth, we define the probability of abandonment 
by year X as the percent of price path iterations during which the representative farmer abandons 
by year X. After 10 years, that percentage rises to 51 percent, and after 20 years, that percentage 
is 70 percent (Table 2). (Because abandonment is a trapping state, the probability of the farmer 
having abandoned is strictly nondeclining over time.) For a typical farmer, therefore, a 
combination of price variability, uncertainty, and constraints leads the farmer to abandon coffee 
within 20 years in 70 percent of randomly drawn price paths; in other words, there is a 
probability of abandonment of 0.70 by Year 20. 
To discern what leads to the decision to abandon, we can analyze farmer decisions to 
harvest and perform maintenance (HM) over time. In 22 percent of iterations resulting in 
abandonment, the farmer moves from HM directly to A, and in the remaining 78 percent of 
abandonment decisions the farmer chooses HO, forgoing maintenance, for an average of 4.38 
years before moving to A. If low prices force the farmer to forgo maintenance in a given period, 
the farmer either “bounces back” to HM in the subsequent period, or begins a downward slide of 
consecutive years of HO, eventually resulting in abandonment. Of all transitions from HM to HO 
over all iterations, 41 percent eventually result in abandonment and 59 percent are followed by 
HM in subsequent periods. On average, the farmer bounces back approximately 1 time per 20-
year projection. In fewer than 3 percent of iterations was the farmer able to choose HO two 
periods in a row and still revert to HM, and the farmer was never able to do so after three periods 
of HO. The farmer was able to choose HO for no more than 7 consecutive periods before 
                                                 
4 The average real 2000 coffee price for Pochutla, Oaxaca, for 1998 through 2003 was 726 pesos/quintal pergamino, 
with a standard deviation of 285, based on data from the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT) and the International 
Coffee Organization (ICO), adjusted for inflation and converted to pesos using exchange rates from the Banco de 
México. In our study area, one quintal weighs 46 kilograms. Most farmers in Oaxaca sell pergamino, the green 
coffee whose paper-like membrane has not been removed. 
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declining yields forced the farmer to choose A. The simulations show that subsistence constraints 
and low prices lead farmers to forgo maintenance, and that this decision often leads to A due to a 
downward cycle of declining yields. 
Policy and Sensitivity Analysis 
A variety of policies could alter farmers’ decisions enough to encourage them to remain 
in coffee production. This analysis focuses on extending credit, paying a price premium for 
shade-grown coffee, providing a price floor for coffee, creating conservation payments for 
environmental services, and performing agricultural extension to boost the productivity of 
existing plantations. Although we have carefully parameterized the model to represent the 
coastal Oaxacan setting, we perform some sensitivity analysis on those parameters to understand 
the model more fully before we delve into policy analysis. Except for analysis scenarios 
affecting realized coffee prices, policy and sensitivity analysis scenarios use the same randomly 
drawn price paths as in the benchmark case. That is, we assume that the price drawn in year X of 
iteration A of the benchmark case is the price drawn in year X in iteration A of the comparable 
sensitivity and policy case. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
We performed a number of sensitivity analyses to explore model functionality under 
alternative scenarios pertaining to price, farm, and farmer characteristics. Namely, we adjusted 
coffee price variability, farmer expectations of future prices, the discount rate of future 
expectations, the yield curve describing coffee growth and decline, farmer credit and subsistence 
constraints, and farmer treatment of uncertainty in decisions. 
Price Variability. We based our benchmark variability for random prices drawn from a 
normal distribution on the variability seen in prices during the late 1990s. We adjusted the 
variance of this normal distribution in sensitivity analyses, and show the results in Table 3. 
Reducing the standard deviation of the price distribution from the benchmark’s 250 to 150 
(around a mean of 750) reduces the probability of abandonment by Year 10 from 51 to 28 
percent, and by Year 20 from 70 to 37 percent, a 45- and 47-percent reduction, respectively. 
Increasing the standard deviation to 350 doubles the probability of abandonment for the first 6 
years, but by Year 20 the difference is smaller, with approximately 27 percent more 
abandonment than in the benchmark case. This decreasing impact of price variation comes from 
the fact that, as farmers accumulate wealth (as is the case in later years of the projection, after 
many years of HM), they are less sensitive to bad-price years. These changes in abandonment in 
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response to price variability appear reasonable and demonstrate the importance of modeling 
farmer decisions under uncertainty as opposed to assuming that the average price is enough to 
depict farmer decisions.  
Price Expectations. In the benchmark analysis, farmers base their price expectations on 
the known distribution of prices. In reality, farmers probably base their price expectations on 
experience and other information, although farmers in this region have access to NYBOT prices 
on a daily basis and are savvy about prices.5 Some of the farmers we interviewed stated that they 
use some sort of historical average to determine price expectations. Using the benchmark 
parameters, but assuming future price expectations to be the three-year running average of prices 
in the current and two previous years, farmers in the simulation had an increased probability of 
abandonment over the benchmark. After 20 years, the probability of abandonment is about 13 
percent higher than that of the benchmark (Table 4). We performed additional sensitivity and 
policy simulations beyond those discussed here on these farmers, but we found the results to be 
qualitatively very similar to those from farmers with known distribution of prices. For this 
reason, and because farmers expressed various ways of forming price expectations, we discuss 
subsequent analyses only with regard to price expectations based on a known distribution. 
Discount Rate. We chose a rather low discount rate of 5 percent in the benchmark case 
as a conservative assumption to ensure that farmers adequately consider the long-term future.6 
We varied the discount rate in sensitivity analyses and found that the probability of abandonment 
per year is remarkably insensitive to the discount rate between 0 and 10 percent. By the twentieth 
year, a discount rate of 0 results in only 3 percent fewer iterations of abandonment than in the 
benchmark case, whereas a discount rate of 10percent results in no change in the probability of 
abandonment (Table 5). A discount rate of 20 percent, however, causes all farmers to abandon by 
the ninth year. These simulations demonstrate that, when the future carries weight in current 
decisions, farmers are more likely to perform costly maintenance activities in exchange for 
higher yields in subsequent periods and thereby forestall the slide toward abandonment. 
                                                 
5 Universidad del Mar (UMAR), in Oaxaca, has broadcast daily coffee prices over the radio since the late 1990s.  
6 The discount rate and the number of years forward considered by the farmer in the decision rule are closely 
related; a farmer with a higher discount rate is similar to one who is less forward-looking, and vice versa. However, 
although computing time increases exponentially with increased number of years forward-looking, it is unaffected 
by changes to discount rate. Thus, we decided to limit the years forward-looking to 10, but lower the discount rate 
such that years closer to the horizon are still considered in the decision rule. 
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Yield Curve. The S-shaped logistic curves for the growth and decline of biomass (and 
thus of yield) are defined by three key parameters. First, they are defined by the maximum 
achievable yield, or the asymptotic maximum of both curves. As we parameterize initial farmer 
yield (that is, yield in the first period) to typical regional conditions, changing the maximum 
achievable yield is equivalent to changing where on the curves the farmer begins; a lower 
maximum (relative to initial yield) implies that the farmer starts off closer to the asymptotic part 
of the curves. The probability of abandonment is relatively insensitive to changing this 
parameter; a 20-percent higher maximum yield results in a 4-percent greater probability of 
abandonment by the twentieth year, and a 20-percent decrease in maximum yield results in a 10-
percent lower probability of abandonment by the twentieth year (Table 6). This result 
demonstrates that, as farmer yield approaches the asymptotic maximum, farmers are better able 
to bear bad-price years, because the impact on yield of forgoing maintenance in a single period is 
small in that part of the curve.  
Second and third, the curves are defined by their steepness; the growth curve is 
determined by a rate-of-growth parameter, and the decline curve is determined by a rate-of-
decline parameter that is defined as a multiple of the rate-of-growth parameter. For sensitivity 
analysis, we vary the rate-of-growth parameter as well as the rate-of-decline multiplier, thus 
varying both the absolute steepness of the curves and the relative difference in steepness. 
Changing the rate-of-growth parameter by a third in either direction (and holding constant the 
rate-of-decline multiplier) resulted in less than a 7-percent change in probability of abandonment 
(Table 6). Changing the relative difference in steepness of the curves, however, resulted in 
significant changes to probability of abandonment. Decreasing the multiplier by 33 percent (and 
thus decreasing the rate of decline relative to rate of growth) results in a 26-percent lower 
probability of abandonment, whereas increasing the multiplier by 33 percent results in a 16-
percent higher probability of abandonment.  
These three sensitivity analyses suggest that the relative difference in yield following 
either maintaining or not maintaining is an important driver of farmer decisions. This result is not 
surprising, but does suggest that making smart policy decisions may be dependent on being able 
to predict with some precision the yield penalty of forgone maintenance. 
Credit and Subsistence Constraints. The benchmark farmer faces subsistence and 
credit constraints. If, in a given year, the coffee price is too low to meet subsistence and the 
farmer does not have enough accrued wealth to make up the difference, the farmer will have no 
choice but to forgo maintenance. If the farmer faces no subsistence constraint, the farmer has a 
very low probability of abandonment; in the case in which subsistence costs are zero, there is 
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only an 11-percent probability that the farmer will abandon by Year 20 (Table 7). Farmers that 
abandon in this case do so due to prices that are so low that the farmers cannot even cover the 
costs of coffee production. In the case in which there is no credit constraint, which is equivalent 
to the farmer having an infinite credit limit, the probability of abandonment drops to zero. This 
suggests that, absent a credit constraint, HM is the preferable long-term strategy given the 
benchmark price distribution. In general, farmers who do not face cost or credit constraints are 
highly likely to stay on the path of regular maintenance.  
Open-Loop Farmer. The benchmark farmer uses a closed-loop formulation in which the 
farmer makes decisions that incorporate the fact that forthcoming price information in 
subsequent periods will dispel uncertainty about expectations of future earnings that result from 
these decisions. The closed-loop decision leads the farmer to choose an option that is more 
flexible (not irreversible) in order to be able to take advantage of the forthcoming information. 
This decision is contrasted with the open-loop formulation, in which the farmer ignores the 
forthcoming information, uses simply the expected value of each option in each future period, 
and makes less flexible choices. The quasi-option value is the value of the forthcoming 
information, or the value of dispelling uncertainty, conditional on remaining flexible enough to 
use that information, and is defined as the difference between the benefits of the closed-loop and 
open-loop farmers (Arrow and Fisher 1974, Albers 1996). In sensitivity analysis, the open-loop 
farmer makes nearly all of the same decisions as in the benchmark case. Although there are small 
differences in decisions year to year, there is essentially no difference in the probability of 
abandonment by Year 20 (Table 7). Thus, the quasi-option value is very small for the full 
duration, given the price distribution used in the benchmark. Indeed, further analysis suggests 
that, given our benchmark parameters, farmer expectations of the net present value of HM are 
nearly always greater than expectations for HO, and that farmer decisions to forgo maintenance 
are therefore due almost entirely to subsistence and credit constraints rather than to decisions 
made without regard for forthcoming information. 
Policy Analysis 
We tested a variety of policies designed to encourage farmers to remain in coffee 
production. These policies are aimed at shielding farmers from low prices that otherwise would 
force abandonment. Extending credit to farmers allows them to weather bad price years, while 
providing a price floor similarly protects against bad years. Likewise, certification for shade-
grown coffee opens farmers to premium markets with higher prices, while agricultural extension 
services boost the productivities of existing plantations. Another policy involves creating 
  12Resources for the Future  Batz et al. 
conservation payments for the environmental services provided by shade-grown coffee over 
alternate land uses. 
Intraperiod Credit. Most farmers on average-size coffee farms (5 to 10 hectares) in this 
region depend on short-term loans during the growing period to cover costs of production and 
harvesting such as those for hired labor and transportation. Farmers often receive the credit from 
an intermediary who charges a high monthly interest rate and who stipulates that the farmers 
must sell the coffee back at a set price after harvest. In the benchmark case, the monthly interest 
rate is set to 10 percent, a rate typical of the region, and we assume the duration of the loan to be 
four months. Doubling the monthly interest rate to 20 percent increases the probability of 
abandonment by Year 20 by 14 percent (Table 8). Halving the interest rate to 5 percent reduces 
this probability by 5 percent, and an interest rate of 0 percent reduces the probability by 13 
percent. These simulations signal that high interest costs on these short-term loans can cause 
farmers to abandon, and that lower interest rates, such as those found in farmer cooperatives, 
may markedly decrease the likelihood of abandonment.  
Interperiod Credit. In the benchmark case, the farmer does not have access to credit 
other than the short-term intraperiod loans described above. Providing access to year-to-year 
credit could prevent the downward cycle toward abandonment by enabling farmers to perform 
maintenance in low price years when declining prices otherwise would force them to forgo such 
activities to seek wage employment. After the collapse of the Mexican Coffee Institute 
(INMECAFE) in 1989, little of this type of interperiod credit is available in our study region. We 
estimated three levels of credit availability: low, equal to about 25 percent of annual subsistence 
needs; mid, equal to about 50 percent of subsistence needs, and high, equal (approximately) to 
subsistence. In the low-credit scenario, the probability of abandonment is reduced by the tenth 
year by 30 percent and by the twentieth year by 21 percent (Table 9). Doubling available credit 
reduces the probability of abandonment in Year 20 by 46 percent, and doubling the credit limit 
again reduces abandonment by 74 percent. Clearly, access to credit enables farmers to overcome 
subsistence constraints and thus prevent themselves from sliding toward abandonment.  
In the above simulations, however, we made credit available starting in the first period. In 
practice, such policies are usually implemented only once a problem begins to reveal itself. If the 
credit is not made available until the fifth or tenth year, the efficacy of all three credit scenarios 
decreases dramatically. In the low-credit case, making the credit available in the tenth period 
results in only a 5-percent reduction from the baseline in probability of abandonment, compared 
with a 21-reduction if credit is made available in the first period. The efficacy of the middle-
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credit case is reduced from a 42-percent reduction in probability of abandonment to 6 percent, 
and the effect of the high-credit case drops from an 80-percent reduction to just 11 percent.  
The timing of the credit policy is important for determining its effectiveness. If policy 
makers wait until farmers begin to abandon before implementing a credit program, yield levels 
may be too far depressed to enable farmers to remain in coffee production. The credit program 
has a much larger impact when implemented at a time when it enables farmers to avoid the 
beginning of the downward cycle of low maintenance and depressed yields rather than when 
implemented at the outward crisis point of abandonment. 
Price Premium. In some areas, although rarely in our study region, certification of green 
coffee practices enables farmers to receive a price premium for their shade-grown, organic, or 
bird-friendly coffee of 5 percent to 15 percent above noncertified coffee. In our simulations, 
price premiums of 5 percent and 15 percent of the mean price reduce the probability of 
abandonment by Year 20 by 24 percent and 74 percent, respectively (Table 10, top). These 
policies essentially shift upwards the entire path of price draws, which has two significant 
effects. First, low prices that otherwise would have resulted in forgone maintenance are 
increased enough that farmers can afford to perform maintenance and still meet subsistence. 
Second, the price increase also provides enough additional profit to make it easier for farmers to 
return to HM after time in HO, thereby preventing the slide toward abandonment. Probability of 
eventual abandonment increases with delays in policy implementation, however. If premiums are 
implemented in the fifth year, the probability of eventual abandonment is 65 percent and 48 
percent for 5-percent and 15-percent price premiums, respectively, while immediate 
implementation results in abandonment probabilities of 53 percent and 18 percent, respectively. 
Once yields are low due to years of forgone maintenance, the price premium policy is much less 
effective in stemming abandonment.  
This analysis assumes that the price premium is available at no cost, but in reality, the 
certification process has significant associated costs. In addition to fees for certification, labeling, 
and other services charged by certifying bodies, such as the Organic Crop Improvement 
Association (OCIA), farmers must pay the Certificadora Mexicana de Productos y Procesos 
Ecológicos (CERTIMEX), the main certifying agent in our study area, for annual or biannual 
inspections. These certification fees include costs for travel, report writing, and translation. 
Farmers might also have to change on-farm processes if certification inspections indicate that 
they are out of compliance. In our analysis, we introduce three years of certification costs prior to 
the price premium at the conservative estimate of 1,000 pesos per hectare per year, based on 
Universidad del Mar (UMAR) researchers’ analysis of data from OCIA and CERTIMEX. These 
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costs put additional price pressure on farmers in those three years and thus reduce the efficacy of 
the price premium policy by as much as 9 percent (Table 10, bottom). Without certification 
costs, a 15-percent price premium initiated in Year 5 (to allow for the three-year certification 
period) results in a 31-percent reduction in probability of abandonment by Year 20; with 
certification costs, there is only a 22-percent reduction.  
Price Floor. A policy that creates a coffee price floor limits the farmer’s exposure to bad-
price years. Mexico has such a policy in place, although farmers must file paperwork and work 
with registered buyers to qualify. This price floor is about 675 pesos per quintal of pergamino, 
which is well within the benchmark price distribution. In our analysis, a price floor at this level 
(10 percent below the mean price) reduces abandonment completely if initiated in the first period 
(Table 11). A lower price floor of 625 (17 percent below mean price) reduces the probability of 
abandonment by 47 percent by Year 20 and prevents any abandonment in the first six years. 
Again, a price floor established in Year 5 or Year 10 has a much more limited impact on 
abandonment (Table 11), with a particularly striking difference in the efficacy of the higher price 
floor. In scenarios in which price floors are implemented in later years, farmers drive yields 
down through lack of maintenance in the years prior to the policy, and the policies cannot help 
them recover; yields are already driven too low to prevent abandonment over time.  
Agricultural Extension. Agricultural extension activities operate on the productivity of 
the plantations. In our analysis, a policy that increases the underlying productivity of the 
plantation by approximately 11 percent dramatically reduces the probability of abandonment by 
63 percent over 20 years, from a 70- to a 26-percent probability of abandonment (Table 12). This 
policy increases yields, and thus income, and alters the probability of abandonment in two ways. 
First, higher yields and income mean farmers do not need to forgo maintenance as often. Second, 
when farmers do forgo maintenance, their yields are not depressed to as low a level as without 
the policy’s yield boost. As with the price and credit policies, however, waiting until the fifth 
year to implement the policy halves its effectiveness in reducing abandonment because, for some 
farmers, yields are already low.7  
Conservation Payments. Mexico has recently announced a conservation program for 
forested land in which the government will give landowners annual payments of about 400 pesos 
                                                 
7 There is generally a two- to five-year lag from the time when agricultural extension staff initiate activities before 
farmers realize substantial increases to yield 
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per hectare to maintain forest cover. In our simulations, farmers receive these payments so long 
as they choose to harvest. Under such a policy initiated in Year 1, the probability of 
abandonment by Year 20 is reduced markedly, by nearly 50 percent (Table 13). Waiting until 
Year 5 to enact the policy reduces the efficacy of the policy by more than half, resulting in only 
19-percent fewer iterations resulting in abandonment. Conservation payment policies are 
generally time limited, however. If conservation payments are provided for only five years 
starting in Year 1, the probability of abandonment by Year 20 is reduced only by 21 percent 
compared with the benchmark.  
Discussion of Policy Analysis 
The results that we present here derive from a stylized decision model of a farmer that is 
parameterized to a typical farmer in the region, though heterogeneity in farm characteristics 
(size, yield, wealth, labor, access to transportation and credit) and site-specific situations will 
likely affect the efficacy of any chosen policy. Nonetheless, the results of analyses do provide 
some general guidance to policy for promoting shade-grown coffee where traditional farmers 
already use this production process. Any policy that enables shade-grown coffee farmers to meet 
subsistence more easily will slow abandonment.  
The first lesson of this policy analysis is that timing is everything. In shade-coffee 
plantations, the decision to abandon is rarely the result of a single year of low yield or prices. 
The downward cycle of low income, forgone maintenance, and declining yields usually lasts 
numerous years before abandonment is necessary, but the longer a farmer stays in this cycle, the 
less likely it becomes that the farmer will ever recover. This strong pressure implies that policies 
enacted near the end of the downward cycle will have little impact on rates of abandonment, 
whereas policies enacted as farmers begin to forgo maintenance will have greater impact. 
Timing issues aside, the choice between policies may largely be one of cost effectiveness. 
The analysis here provides only limited information about the costs of simulated policies, but 
some comparisons are possible. First, price floor policies are more cost effective than price 
premium policies because price floors only kick in during bad-price years. A price floor of 10 
percent below mean price that is initiated in Year 1 reduces abandonment by 100 percent and 
costs approximately 15,000 pesos (real 2,000 pesos, discounted at 5 percent) per farmer over the 
twenty-year period, whereas a price premium of 15 percent over mean price initiated in Year 1 
reduces abandonment by 74 percent at a cost of around 40,000 pesos per farmer. These two 
policies, however, differ substantially in who bears the costs: A price floor policy imposes costs 
on the government, whereas the price premium policy passes costs on to the consumers of 
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certified coffee. It is more difficult to compare costs of price and credit policies, but credit 
policies may be more cost effective because farmers must pay back the loans, with interest. In 
our analysis, credit policies have no interest rates and no time constraints on payback, so it is not 
surprising that they cost much less than price polices per percent reduction in rate of 
abandonment. Credit policies, however, cannot achieve the same sized reductions as price 
policies except at very high, and unreasonable, credit limits. The cost effectiveness of 
conservation payments ranges between that of price floor and price premium policies, and puts 
the cost burden on the nongovernmental organization (NGO) or government agency that values 
those public goods. We do not have reliable data on the costs of agricultural extension policies—
which may include a wide variety of activities, such as planting additional crops, introducing 
pesticides or fertilizer, initiating education or information dissemination programs, or training 
managers—so we cannot reasonably estimate their cost effectiveness. 
Beyond cost effectiveness, the success of a policy may lie in which subgroups of farmers 
benefit. Our surveys of farmers in coastal Oaxaca provide some information about which farmers 
have access to particular policies. For example, our discussions revealed that coffee farmers who 
belong to cooperative organizations—approximately 55 percent of the coffee farmers in this 
region belong to cooperatives—have better access to intra- and interperiod credit and to 
agricultural extension activities than do other farmers. The effectiveness of introducing these 
types of policies, then, relies on ensuring that farmers outside cooperatives have access to these 
programs or are encouraged to participate in a cooperative organization. Similarly, Mexico’s 
current price floor policy requires that farmers fill out various forms and agree to sell to 
registered buyers in order to receive the minimum price. Farmers who do not belong to 
cooperatives, do not speak or read Spanish (estimated to be 7 percent of the region’s farmers), or 
who live in areas far from coffee marketing towns have reduced access to these papers and 
buyers, and therefore often do not benefit from the price floor. Likewise, there are language, 
access, and credit barriers to farmers benefiting from agricultural extension policies. Although 
the region has few examples of green certification for the price premium and the conservation 
payments have not yet begun, the effectiveness of these policies could also be limited by similar 
issues of access, particularly for farmers who are poorer, less well educated, indigenous, or who 
are located in more remote regions. 
Further Policy Analysis: Joint Implementation  
These issues of which farmers will have access to the benefits of particular policies or 
programs mean that the policies can only be effective to the extent that farmers can participate. 
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For example, despite its appeal, a price premium policy can only offer benefits to farmers, and 
therefore can only slow abandonment, if farmers can overcome the large costs associated with 
certifying their coffee plantation as shade grown, organic, or bird friendly. Farmers who 
participate in cooperative organizations may face lower certification costs due to access to 
markets and credit. To reach other farmers, the region could implement a price premium policy 
at the same time as a price floor to enable farmers to incur a few years of certification costs and 
weather bad-price years prior to being able to capture the price premium. We ran simulations for 
joint policies in which we implemented combinations of programs to overcome multiple barriers 
and aid a greater number of farmers. 
As discussed previously, 44 percent of the farmers who face three years of certification 
costs prior to a price premium of 15 percent starting in Year 5 abandon by Year 10, and 55 
percent of these farmers abandon by Year 20. The case in which certification costs are zero is 
equivalent to a policy in which the government pays for certification; even in this case, discussed 
previously, 42 percent of the farmers abandon by Year 10 and 48 percent of them abandon by 
Year 20. In contrast, only 17 percent of the farmers with access to a joint policy involving a price 
floor in the certification years prior to the price premium abandons by Year 10 and 25 percent of 
these farmers abandon by Year 20 (Table 14, top left). If in addition to the price floor the farmer 
also has access to some interperiod credit and a lower interest rate for short-term intraperiod 
loans, only 2 percent of the farmers abandon by Year 10 and 3 percent of them abandon by Year 
20 (Table 14, top right). As with individual policies, if the government waits to implement joint 
policies for five years results in much lower reductions in abandonment (Table 14, bottom).  
In practice, implementing a policy alone can decrease its effectiveness, because some 
farmers face constraints that make the policy inaccessible to them. In addition, there may be a lag 
between costs and benefits; costs of green certification occur before farmers realize higher 
prices, and it may take several years before agricultural extension or maintenance activities result 
in higher productivity. Eliminating or reducing barriers to accessibility, as well as providing 
credit or price supports during the lag years between investment and pay off, will increase 
effectiveness of policies. Indeed, policies may flounder without these additional supports. 
Case Study: Price Declines in Coastal Oaxaca 
Anecdotal and Landsat image analyses demonstrate that some forest cover in Mexico’s 
shade-grown coffee region has declined in the last fifteen years, and that high levels of coffee 
abandonment leave many forests vulnerable (Blackman et al. 2004). Farmers report that much of 
the conversion or the abandonment of coffee production is due to the precipitous decline in 
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international coffee prices during the 1990s. In addition, Mexico’s coffee marketing board, 
INMECAFE, closed in 1989 after years of providing price floors and low-cost credit to many 
coffee farmers. The model developed here can be used to examine how a typical farmer might 
have responded to these changes in the coffee market and to investigate what issues confront 
implementation of policies intended to stem abandonment.  
We examine a typical shade-grown coffee farmer’s decisions over the last 15 years (1989 
through 2003) based on actual prices (Figure 1), and then project the farmer forward an 
additional 5 years using the average price of 2000–2003. Based on interviews, farmers appear to 
fall loosely into several groups in terms of how they formed price expectations during this period 
(1989 through 2003). First, although no farmers reported that they failed eventually to recognize 
that the international and Mexican coffee markets had fundamentally changed, we consider a 
“price regime–unaware” farmer who expects prices in the 1990s to be drawn from a distribution 
similar to that seen previous to 1989 (Table 15, column 1). With actual prices somewhat lower 
than expected, the farmer performs maintenance activities in 12 of the first 13 years, then stops 
performing maintenance in 2002, embarking on a 6 year slide toward abandonment.  
The second type of farmer is the “price regime–aware” farmer—who recognizes that a 
price regime change has occurred, and bases expectations of prices on a distribution with a 
consequently lower mean. This farmer forgoes maintenance in 1992 due to the low price, but 
otherwise performs maintenance through 2001 (Table 15, column 2). The farmer forgoes 
maintenance in 2002, starting the downward cycle and abandoning in 2007, one year earlier than 
the “price regime–unaware” farmer. In some cases, farmers may take several years to recognize a 
price regime change, but even a lag of 10 years does not create a difference in farmer decisions 
compared with the price regime–aware farmer who recognizes the regime change immediately. 
For farmers at this level of yield, wealth, and available credit, the expectations of future prices do 
not drive many decisions at the margin. 
A third type of farmer uses a three-year running average of the current and 2 prior years 
of prices to forecast prices over time, as in the sensitivity analyses described previously. The 
“Bayesian average price” farmer performs maintenance in 10 of the first 12 years, forgoes 
maintenance in 2001, and abandons in 2002 (Table 15, column 5). Both the price regime–
unaware farmer and the Bayesian average farmer bounce back from one year of HO following 
the low price in 1992, but neither is able to bounce back from the low prices in the early 2000s. 
A fourth type of farmer reported that they viewed prices to be dropping, on average, over 
the period. These “price trend–aware” farmers performed maintenance activities for 11 of the 
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first 12 years, but did not perform maintenance activities in or after 2001, resulting in a projected 
abandonment date of 2005 (Table 15, column 6). Again, a lag in recognizing that prices are 
declining—even a lag of 10 years—does not lead to differences in farming activities. The 
duration of the downward cycle is only four years for these farmers (contrasted to five years for 
price regime–aware farmers), as their expectations of prices beyond 2003 continue to drop below 
tenable levels. 
In addition to differences in how farmers form price expectations, farms in this region 
vary in levels of productivity. Regardless of how a farmer forms price expectations, if the 
starting yield in 1989 is lower than in the benchmark, the farmer will abandon earlier. In these 
cases (Table 15, columns 9–16), having a long lag before recognizing the price regime change 
encourages farmers to perform maintenance in more periods, but all farmers abandon by 2004. 
Conversely, farmers with better yielding farms can weather bad-price years more easily and do 
not enter a slide toward abandonment in late periods. In addition, farmers with access to wealth 
or credit are more likely to continue to perform maintenance activities at the prices seen during 
the last 15 years. 
The fact that so many farmers at relevant yield levels have begun to forgo maintenance 
activities in recent years in these simulations signals that the cumulative impact of low prices has 
led these farmers into a downward cycle moving toward abandonment. To the extent that our 
interviews and data collection have enabled us to characterize a typical farmer in the region, and 
given the earlier policy analysis discussion regarding the importance of the timing of policies, 
these stylized results using actual prices suggest that there may be very few years left to 
implement policies to stem abandonment—at least within an important subgroup of farmers—of 
shade-grown coffee production in Oaxaca’s Sierra Sur y Costa. 
Conclusion 
Many groups seek to support the production of shade-grown coffee both to improve the 
welfare of impoverished traditional shade-grown coffee farmers and to ensure that this land use 
continues, because it protects species and provides environmental services. Despite the intuitive 
appeal of, and large push by NGOs for, developing policies that allow shade-grown coffee 
farmers to capture some value for the public goods this land use provides, very little is known 
about how traditional shade-grown coffee farmers make decisions and, therefore, how they will 
respond to any type of policy. Because many such farmers appear to have responded to recent 
falls in coffee prices by abandoning this production system, understanding that abandonment 
decision and its response to various policies has become a timely issue.  
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This paper develops a model of farmer decisions, based on observations and interviews 
with farmers in coastal Oaxaca; the model elucidates the farmer’s decisions about when to 
abandon shade-coffee production. The typical farmer faces subsistence and credit constraints that 
force him to work in towns and forgo important maintenance activities on the coffee plantation 
during low price years. Because forgoing maintenance drives future yields down, this farmer 
faces increased price pressure in future years and therefore finds it even more difficult to perform 
maintenance. The farmer may be forced to forgo maintenance year after year, until yields are 
driven so low that the farmer decides to abandon shade-coffee production altogether.  
The policy analysis presented here suggests that policies that enable farmers to perform 
maintenance activities during bad-price years can effectively stem abandonment. The analysis 
stresses, however, that such policies are much more effective when implemented before farmers 
forgo maintenance than when they are implemented when abandonment is imminent. Timing is 
critical. Anecdotal information and simulations of decisions under recent historical prices 
suggest that many farmers have already begun the slide toward abandonment; rapid policy 
intervention is required to stop and reverse this slide. Furthermore, observations of the Oaxaca 
setting and our simulations indicate that implementing policies jointly improves the effectiveness 
of policies by reaching more farmers and by enabling farmers to incur the costs of investment 
that may be required to take advantage of some policies. Poor farmers, indigenous farmers, and 
farmers who are not members of cooperatives have limited abilities to respond to policy 
incentives unless multiple policies combine to address their joint issues of credit, subsistence, 
logistal concerns, and language barriers.  
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Figures and Tables 
Table 1. Key Model Parameters for Benchmark Farmer  
Variable Description  Value 
YEARSOUT  Years forward looking  10 
PSTART  Mean of coffee price distribution (pesos)  750 
PVAR  Standard deviation of coffee price dist (pesos)  250 
PSLOPE  Declining slope of coffee price dist (pesos/year)  0 
PRICEDIST  Type of price distribution  Normal
DISCRATE  Discount rate  5% 
FSIZE  Farm size (hectares)  5 
BIORATE  Biomass growth factor  0.075 
BIOMULT  Rate of biomass decline as multiple of growth  5 
STARTPCTBIO  Starting biomass as percent of maximum  70% 
YIELDRATE  Initial yield rate (quintals of pergamino/hectare)  6.1 
STARTYIELD  Initial total yield (quintals of pergamino)  30.5 
STARTMASS  Initial biomass (Yield = 10% of biomass)  305 
BIOMAX  Maximum biomass  436 
CREDIT_ANN  Annual available interperiod credit (pesos)  0 
CREDIT_TOT  Total available interperiod credit (pesos)  0 
MIDINTEREST  Intraperiod credit monthly interest rate (harvest costs)  10% 
PCTSAVINGS  Savings rate (percent of income over subsistence)  10% 
STARTWEALTH  Initial accumulated wealth (pesos)  500 
TLABOR_F  Total annual available farmer labor (work days)  190 
HLABOR_F  Farmer labor used for harvest (work days)  150 
MLABOR_F  Farmer labor used for maintenance (work days)  40 
HLAB_PH  Labor required to harvest (work days/hectare)  35 
MLAB_PH  Labor required to maintain (work days/hectare)  34 
WAGE_ON  Wage rate for hired on-farm labor (pesos/work day)  60 
WAGE_OFF  Wage rate for off-farm labor (adjusted) (pesos/work day)  53 
NONLABOR_H  Nonlabor costs for harvesting (pesos/hectare)  61 
NONLABOR_M  Nonlabor costs for maintenance (pesos/hectare)  165 
SUBSISTENCE  Subsistence 9970 
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Table 2. Cumulative Probability of Coffee Abandonment by Benchmark Farmer, by Year   
Year  Probability of 
abandonment  Year  Probability of 
abandonment 
1 0%  11  55% 
2 5%  12  57% 
3 10%  13  58% 
4 12%  14  59% 
5 15%  15  64% 
6 21%  16  65% 
7 29%  17  66% 
8 39%  18  66% 
9 45%  19  67% 




Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis Results: Price Variability 









Price mean  750  750  750  750  750 
Price standard deviation  250  450  350  150  50 
Probability of abandonment                    
... by Year 10  51%  78% (54%) 67% (32%) 28% (–45%) 3% (–95%)
... by Year 15  64%  89% (39%) 79% (23%) 36% (–44%) 3% (–96%)
... by Year 20  70%  95% (35%) 83% (19%) 37% (–47%) 3% (–96%)
 
Note: In Tables 3 to 9 the percent difference in the probability of abandonment between each run and the benchmark 
run is reported in parentheses, as a percentage of the benchmark probability. 
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Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis Results: Price Expectations 
 
Benchmark  Bayesian price 
expectations 
Probability of abandonment       
... by Year 10  51%  56%  (11%) 
... by Year 15  64%  73%  (14%) 
... by Year 20  70%  79%  (13%) 
 










Discount rate  5%  0%  10%  20% 
Probability of abandonment               
... by Year 10  51%  47% (–8%)  51% (0%)  100%(97%)
... by Year 15  64%  61% (–4%)  64% (0%)  100%(56%)
... by Year 20  70%  68% (–3%)  70% (0%)  100%(43%)
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Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis Results: Yield Curve 
    Maximum biomass  Rate-of-growth parameter Rate-of-decline multiplier
  












Starting yield (quintals)  30.500 30.500 30.500 30.500 30.500  30.500 30.500 
Maximum yield  43.571  34.857  52.286 43.571 43.571  43.571 43.571 
Growth rate parameter  0.075 0.075 0.075 0.050 0.100 0.075 0.075 
Decline rate multiplier  5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 3.333 6.667 
Probability of abandonment                         
... by Year 10  51%  25% (–50%) 61% (21%)  34% (–33%) 54% (7%)  27% (–47%)  64% (26%)
... by Year 15  64%  47% (–26%) 68% (6%)  57% (–10%) 62% (–3%) 43% (–33%)  76% (19%)




Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis Results: Constraints and Open-Loop Decision Rule 






Probability  of  abandonment          
... by Year 10  51%  1% (–99%) 0% (–100%) 49%  (–3%) 
... by Year 15  64%  1% (–99%) 0% (–100%) 63%  (–1%) 




Table 8. Policy Analysis Results: Lowering Short-Term Intraperiod Interest Rates 
 
Benchmark  No 
 interest rate 
Low 
 interest rate 
High 
 interest rate 
Monthly interest rate  10%  0%  5%  20% 
Probability  of  abandonment          
... by Year 10  51%  44% (–13%) 47% (–7%) 62%  (22%)
... by Year 15  64%  56% (–13%) 60% (–6%) 73%  (15%)
... by Year 20  70%  61% (–13%) 67% (–5%) 80%  (14%)
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Table 9. Policy Analysis Results: Access to Interperiod Credit 
  Benchmark  Low credit  Middle credit  High credit 
Credit limit (pesos)    2,500  5,000  10,000 
Year  policy  start    1 5  10  1 5  10  1 5  10 
Probability  of  abandonment                
























































Table 10. Policy Analysis Results: Access to Price Premiums, with and without 
Certification Costs 
  Benchmark  5% price premium, 
NO certification costs 
15% price premium, 
NO certification costs 
Price premium (pesos)    37.5  37.5  37.5  112.5  112.5  112.5 
Year of policy start    1  5  10  1  5  10 
Probability  of  abandonment                       
... by Year 10  51%  33%(–36%) 47% (–7%) 51% (0%) 13%(–75%) 42%(–17%) 51% (0%) 
... by Year 15  64%  46%(–28%) 58% (–9%) 59% (–8%) 16%(–75%) 47%(–26%) 57%(–10%)
... by Year 20  70%  53%(–24%) 65% (–8%) 65% (–7%) 18%(–74%) 48%(–31%) 62%(–11%)
  
Benchmark  5% price premium, 
WITH 3 yrs of certification costs 
15% price premium, 
WITH 3 yrs of certification costs 
Price premium (pesos)      37.5  37.5    112.5  112.5 
Year of policy start      5  10    5  10 
Probability  of  abandonment                       
... by Year 10  51%      50% (–1%) 53% (5%)     44%(–13%) 53% (5%) 
... by Year 15  64%      63% (–2%) 62% (–3%)    53%(–17%) 59% (–8%)
... by Year 20  70%      67% (–5%) 68% (–3%)    55%(–22%) 65% (–8%)
Note: Certification costs precede access to premium prices, so if such costs are incurred, the price premium policy 
cannot start in Year 1. 
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Table 11. Policy Analysis Results: Access to Price Floor 
  Benchmark  Low-price floor  High-price floor 
Price floor (pesos)    625.0  625.0  625.0  675.0  675.0  675.0 
Year of policy start    1  5  10  1  5  10 
Probability  of  abandonment                 
... by Year 10  51%  32%(–37%) 46% (–9%) 51% (0%) 0%(–100%)  45%(–11%) 51% (0%) 
... by Year 15  64%  37%(–42%) 49%(–23%) 59% (–7%) 0%(–100%) 47%(–27%) 59% (–7%)




Table 12. Policy Analysis Results: Agricultural Extension to Increase Productivity 
   Benchmark  11% increase in biomass (and yield)  22% increase in biomass (and yield) 
Year of policy start    1  5  10  1  5  10 
Probability  of  abandonment                
... by Year 10  51%  16%(–68%) 39%(–22%) 51% (0%) 7%(–87%)  27%(–47%) 51% (0%) 
... by Year 15  64%  23%(–64%) 47%(–26%) 57%(–10%) 9%(–86%) 34%(–47%) 55%(–14%)





Table 13. Policy Analysis Results: Conservation Payments for Providing Forest Cover 
  Benchmark  Indefinite policy duration  Five-year policy duration 
Size of payment (pesos/ha)    400  400  400  400 
Year of policy start    1  5  1  5 
Probability  of  abandonment                
... by Year 10  51%  25% (–51%)  43% (–14%) 35% (–32%)  43%(–14%)
... by Year 15  64%  33% (–49%)  51% (–20%) 48% (–25%)  56%(–13%)
... by Year 20  70%  36% (–49%)  57% (–19%) 55% (–21%)  61%(–12%)
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Table 14. Policy Analysis Results: Joint Implementation of Price and Credit Policies, 
Varying the Size of Price Premiums and Year of Policy Implementation 
Immediate implementation  Benchmark  Price floor, price premium, no 
changes to credit 
Price floor, price premium, inter- and 
intraperiod credit 
Price floor (pesos)    675  675  675  675 
Price premium (pesos)    37.5  112.5  37.5  112.5 
Interperiod credit (pesos)  0  0  0  2,500  2,500 
Intraperiod credit rate  10%  10%  10%  5%  5% 
Year price floor starts    1  1  1  1 
Year price premium starts    5  5  5  5 
Probability of abandonment                   
... by Year 10  51%  22% (–57%) 17% (–67%) 5% (–89%) 1% (–97%)
... by Year 15  64%  39% (–39%) 21% (–67%) 11% (–82%) 2% (–97%)
... by Year 20  70%  45% (–35%) 25% (–65%) 15% (–78%) 3% (–96%)
Five-year lag  Benchmark  Price floor, price premium, 
no changes to credit 
Price floor, price premium, inter- and 
intraperiod credit 
Price floor (pesos)    675  675  675  675 
Price premium (pesos)    37.5  112.5  37.5  112.5 
Interperiod credit (pesos)  0  0  0  2,500  2,500 
Intraperiod credit rate  10%  10%  10%  5%  5% 
Year price floor starts    5  5  5  5 
Year price premium starts    10  10  10  10 
Probability of abandonment                   
... by Year 10  51%  47% (–8%) 47% (–8%) 29% (–43%) 29% (–43%)
... by Year 15  64%  50% (–22%) 48% (–25%) 30% (–53%) 29% (–55%)
... by Year 20  70%  53% (–24%) 49% (–30%) 31% (–55%) 29% (–59%)
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Table 15. Case Study on Historical Prices: Farmer Decisions under Different Modes of Forming Price Expectations and 
with Different Starting Yields 




unaware  Price regime–aware 
Recent 
average Price trend–aware 
Price 
regime–
unaware  Price regime–aware 
Recent 
average Price trend–aware 
Lag  (years)                              0 5 10 0 5 10 0 5 10 0 5 10
D e c i s i o n   i n                    
Year  1  (1989)                                  HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM
Year  2  (1990)                                  HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM
Year  3  (1991)                                  HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM
Year  4  (1992)                                  HO HO HO HO HO HO HO HO HO HO HO HO HO HO HO HO
Year  5  (1993)                                  HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HO HO HO HO HO HO HO HO
Year  6  (1994)                                  HM HM HM HM HO HM HM HM HM HO HM HM HO HM HM HM
Year  7  (1995)                                  HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HO HO HM HO HM HM HM
Year  8  (1996)                                  HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HO HO HM HO HM HM HM
Year  9  (1997)                                  HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HO HO HM HO HM HM HM
Year  10  (1998)                                  HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM A A HM A HM HM HM
Year  11  (1999)                                  HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM A A HM A HO HO HM
Year  12  (2000)                                  HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM HM A A HM A HO HO HO
Year  13  (2001)                                  HM HM HM HM HO HO HO HO HO A A HO A HO HO HO
Year  14  (2002)                                  HO HO HO HO A HO HO HO HO A A HO A A A A
Year  15  (2003)                                  HO HO HO HO A HO HO HO HO A A HO A A A A
Year  16  (2004)                                  HO HO HO HO A HO HO HO A A A A A A A A
Year  17  (2005)                                  HO HO HO HO A A A A A A A A A A A A
Year  18  (2006)                                  HO HO HO HO A A A A A A A A A A A A
Year  19  (2007)                                  HO A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
Year  20  (2008)                                  A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
HM = “harvest and maintain,” HO = “harvest only,” A = “abandon plantation. 
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Appendix A. Sensitivity Analysis on Performance Parameters 
This appendix discusses model simulations run on two key model performance 
parameters—the number of Monte Carlo iterations used in each simulation, and the number of 
years that the model farmer is forward-looking. Model performance improves by increasing both 
of these parameters, but so does the time it takes for the model to run; we performed sensitivity 
analyses to find an appropriate balance between model accuracy and computational cost. 
For the simulations discussed in the main body of this paper, we ran 150 Monte Carlo 
iterations (representing 150 different randomly drawn price series) for a stylized farmer who 
incorporates 10 future years of expected values into decisions. Increasing these two parameters 
beyond these values effected minor changes in results, but took appreciably longer to run. 
Holding all other variables constant, run time increases linearly with the number of 
iterations, as each iteration takes roughly the same amount of time to run (there is some variation 
due to variation in price series). Simulations with fewer than 100 iterations generate results that, 
although following the same general patterns as the benchmark with 150 iterations, differ 
substantially in magnitudes. For example, a simulation with only 20 iterations results in an 
increase in the probability of abandonment in Year 20 by 7 percent, compared with the 
benchmark (Table A1). Increasing the number of iterations beyond 150, however, neither 
generates qualitative nor large quantitative differences in outcomes; the probability of 
abandonment is within 5 percent of the benchmark in every year. For example, a simulation with 
200 iterations results in a 1-percent deviation from benchmark results for Year 20, but takes 
nearly thirty minutes longer to run. This 29-percent increase in resource costs did not warrant the 
small improvement in accuracy of the benchmark and we chose 150 iterations for the 
benchmark.  
The computational costs of increasing the number of years forward-looking are even 
larger than those for increasing the number of iterations, because the computation of future 
expectations uses a recursive routine that traverses the branches of a decision tree. In this 
decision tree, each node represents a decision period, and each branch from that node represents 
a different decision (HM, HO, or A); the node at that end of each branch represents another 
decision period, and so on. How far into the future this tree goes depends on the number of years 
that the farmer is forward-looking. Increasing another year adds another set of branches to each 
end node of each possible decision pathway. Although there are three possible farmer decisions, 
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because abandonment is a trapping state the number of possible branches in the decision tree 
approaches 2
y, where y is the number of years forward-looking. As shown in Table A2, the 
benchmark case of 10 years forward-looking results in a per-iteration run-time of about 30 
seconds. Decreasing this parameter to 5 years results in an iteration run time of 1 second, 
whereas increasing to 11 years requires a full minute per iteration. Although the five-year future 
window returned results nearly identical to those of the benchmark simulation, we wanted to 
ensure that we included enough future information in current decisions in simulations that were 
not identical to the benchmark case, such as the various policy scenarios in which the future may 
matter more or less than in the benchmark. A simulation of a farmer who is 15 years forward-
looking, however, takes over 44 hours to run, compared with the hour and twenty minutes for a 
farmer who is 10 years forward-looking, and results in absolutely no change in farmer decisions.  
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Appendix B. Spiral: A MATLAB Simulation Model 
We programmed the simulations described in this paper in MATLAB, a mathematical 
software application. Because of price uncertainty that is resolved in each period, we used a 
recursive method to compute the net present value of expected future earnings due to present and 
future decisions. The mental model is that of a decision tree, in which each branch is a decision 
leading to a future period. In any period (in which a farmer has not already abandoned), a farmer 
has three options—HM, HO, or A—and therefore the tree begins with three branches. Each HM 
and HO branch has these same three decision branches, whereas each A branch has only a single 
branch to A (because abandonment is a trapping state). Biomass grows and declines, according 
to a logistic growth function, along the branches of the decision tree, based on harvest and 
maintenance decisions. As biomass (along with farmers’ expectations of future prices) defines 
present value of expected income, the present value of any branch is dependent on a likelihood 
weighting of all stemming (future) branches. Thus, the model propagates biomass growth and 
decline along the branches until it reaches the final leaves, which are defined by the degree to 
which the farmer is forward-looking. Thus, if a farmer is n-years forward-looking, the model 
propagates out to the nth branch, computes the present value of the leaves, recurses back to the 
(n–1)th branch, computes present value of that branch (which includes the present value of the 
nth branch), recurses back to the (n–2)th branch, and so on, until the model has recursed back to 
the decision period. 8
 
                                                 
8 We did not include the programs used in the simulation model with this paper due to their length; they are 
available from the authors in print or electronic format, on request. 
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1. Sensitivity Analysis: Number of Iterations 
  Benchmark  Low iterations  High iterations 
Years forward-looking  10  10  10 
Iterations 150  20  200 
Total run time (hh:mm:ss)  1:21:56  0:17:36  1:45:48 
Average run time per iteration (m:ss)  0:33  0:53  0:32 
Probability of abandonment       
... by Year 10  51%  60% (18%)  53% (5%) 
... by Year 15  64%  75% (17%)  67% (4%) 




Table A2. Sensitivity Analysis: Number of Years Forward-Looking 
  Number of years forward-looking 
   Benchmark  Much lower  Lower  Higher  Much higher 
Years forward-looking  10  1  5  11  15 
Iterations 150  150  150  150  150 
Total run-time (hh:mm:ss)  1:21:56  0:00:06  0:02:39  2:47:11  44:12:36 
Average run-time per iteration 
(m:ss)  0:33 0:00 0:01  1:07  17:41 
Probability of abandonment         
... by Year 10  51%  100% (–97%)  51% (0%)  51% (0%)  51% (0%) 
... by Year 15  64%  100% (–56%)  64% (0%)  64% (0%)  64% (0%) 
... by Year 20  70%  100% (–43%)  70% (0%)  70% (0%)  70% (0%) 
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